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COOPERATION IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES PREDICTS BEHAVIOR IN
INCENTIVE-MATCHED BINARY DILEMMAS: EVIDENCE FOR
STABLE PROSOCIALITY
TIMOTHY L. MULLETT , REBECCA L. MCDONALD and GORDON D.A. BROWN∗
We report the results of an experiment in which subjects completed second mover
public goods game tasks and second mover binary social dilemma tasks. Each task
was completed under three different incentive structures which were matched across
tasks. The use of nonlinear incentive structures, along with a novel categorization
method, allowed us to identify behavioral subtypes that cannot be distinguished using
conventional linear incentive structures. We also examined how well behavior could
be predicted across tasks. Subjects’ average conditional cooperation levels showed
significant cross-task predictability and stability. However, almost a third of responses
(28%) demonstrated unambiguous preference reversals across tasks. We argue that
prosociality is best described as an individual-level trait, similar to risk aversion in
choice under risk. (JEL C7, C91, H41)
I. INTRODUCTION
Akey development in the study of cooperation
has been the identification of behavioral sub-
types. It has long been possible to categorize indi-
viduals as “cooperators” or “defectors” in terms
of their performance on simple binary dilemma
(BD) games such as the prisoner’s dilemma,
where subjects explicitly choose between coop-
eration and defection within a standard game
matrix. More recently, better than binary clas-
sification of individuals has been made possible
by the use of public goods (PG) games which
reveal the responsiveness of an individual’s con-
tributions to the public good as a function of the
contributions made by others to the same public
good (Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr 2001).1
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1. For reviews, see, for example, Ledyard (1994) and
Chaudhuri (2011).
Two key questions are addressed here. The
first concerns whether behavioral subtyping
based on responses in one task can predict
behavior on different tasks (e.g., whether cooper-
ativeness on PG games predicts cooperativeness
on BD games). Is “conditional cooperativeness”
akin to a personality trait, that is, a stable char-
acteristic of an individual that governs their
behavior across a wide range of contexts? Or do
individuals apply such different strategies across
tasks that it is not possible to use their behavioral
subtype in a single task to predict their behavior
in other tasks? A behavioral subtyping that
does not predict performance across economic
games within the laboratory is unlikely to predict
behavior outside the laboratory. Furthermore,
comparisons between more closely controlled
tasks may help to identify why results vary so
substantially between different tests of lab to
field generalizability (Camerer 2011).
The second question is whether there are
additional, or alternative, behavioral subtypes
that are only apparent in PG games with nonlin-
ear incentive structures. Prior investigations have
largely used the linear PG game. However, this
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approach is limited in the number of strategies
it can identify because quite differently moti-
vated strategies can produce identical patterns of
behavior. Specifically, “free-riders” are defined
as individuals who contribute zero to the public
pot regardless of the amount being contributed
by other players. These individuals are often
interpreted as payoff-maximizers, because the
dominant strategy for a self-interested individual
in the linear PG game is to contribute nothing
regardless of others’ contributions.2 However,
zero contribution could alternatively reflect
strategies of noninvestment or nonengagement
with the market. Similarly, it is unclear whether
conditional cooperators imitate other players or
whether they base their decisions on some mix of
factors such as equality of contribution, equality
of outcome, and total group payout.
To address our two key questions we develop
a novel within-subjects methodology in which
individuals complete PG and BD tasks with
the same three incentive structures being used
in both tasks. Prior studies on the cross-task
stability of social preferences have led to mixed
conclusions. This is particularly true when com-
paring prosocial behavior in laboratory tasks to
behavior in the real world. Some studies find
significant correlations (Camerer 2011; Dai,
Galeotti, and Villeval 2016; Karlan 2005; Nor-
mann, Requate, and Waichman 2014), but others
report remarkably robust null effects across a
wide range of tasks and measures (Carpenter and
Seki 2011; Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez 2019;
Stoop, Noussair, and van Soest 2012). In many
studies that do report a significant relationship,
the correlation is often noticeably smaller than
test-retest correlations when an individual com-
pletes the same task multiple times. Overall, the
results suggest that many unidentified factors
affect responses and measured prosociality (Fehr
and Leibbrandt 2011; Lamba and Mace 2011).
However, it is not straightforward to identify
specific features of study designs that could
explain why some studies show an effect while
others do not. This is largely because the many
differences between the tasks used in the various
studies make it impossible to determine the
effect of each. Consider, for example, Stoop,
Noussair, and van Soest (2012) who compare
behavior in cooperation tasks in an abstract lab
setting to behavior in comparable field studies
2. An additional point contributed to the public pot gives
a return less than that from keeping it in the private account,
regardless of the other players’ contributions.
at a recreational fishing pond. These authors
find cooperation in the lab, but virtually none
in the field, and convincingly demonstrate that
this contrast is driven by task differences rather
than population differences. However, iden-
tifying the mechanism underpinning the task
effect is impossible, due to the many differences
which could account for (or significantly con-
tribute toward) the difference in cooperation.
For example, social considerations (real or per-
ceived) may have been more salient in the field
because a subject can more immediately see
who else is fishing in the pond, with potential
perceived reputational costs. There are likely to
be diminishing returns to catching fish, since
subjects were required to take their catch home
or dispose of it. Importantly for our own design,
it is difficult to identify how well the incentives
matched across tasks, since the utility of catch-
ing a fish is likely to vary substantially between
subjects in a way that is not true for the money
received in financial tasks. Stoop et al. made an
impressive attempt to control for, or address, as
many potential differences as possible. However,
in this and other field studies, the differences in
framing and incentives will be multi-faceted, and
all but impossible to define comprehensively.
Although we focused on the example of
Stoop, Noussair, and van Soest (2012) similar
issues apply more generally across laboratory
and field experiments. The potential for real
or perceived social pressures and reputational
effects will often differ between studies, or
between tasks within a study. The immediacy
or depth of social interactions will typically be
different in computerized tasks compared to
physical or verbal interactions in tasks in the
field. Even the physical effort required to com-
plete the tasks may differ. Undoubtedly, studies
in the field generate insights that are valuable in
their specific contexts, but due to the proliferation
of differences discussed above, trying to identify
the common causes of behavioral patterns will at
best be a long and inefficient process. The poten-
tial variation in incentives, framing, and subject
perceptions are simply too large. To address this,
others have used entirely laboratory-based stud-
ies. Even in these studies, however, the evidence
for cross-task predictability is mixed.
For example, Blanco, Engelmann, and Nor-
mann (2011) examined inequity aversion (Fehr
and Schmidt 1999) using four different tasks: an
ultimatum game, a PG game, a dictator game,
and a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game. They
found that the majority of players did not behave
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consistently across the different games in the way
predicted by the inequity aversion model. There
were, however, correlations across games—for
example, individuals’ sequential prisoner’s
dilemma second mover-decisions were corre-
lated with their offers in the ultimatum game.
In a detailed analysis of the evidence for the
inequity aversion model, Binmore and Shaked
(2010) concluded that the cross-task predictive
power of the model had not been established;
that is, it is not clear that parameters estimated
from behavior on one task can be used to predict
behavior on another (but for discussion, see
Binmore and Shaked 2010; Gintis 2010). Even if
payoff structures are identical, the level of coop-
erativeness may differ. For example, a number of
studies have found greater cooperativeness in PG
games than in common pool resource games,3
despite suggestions that the games are strategi-
cally equivalent (Ledyard and Palfrey 1995). In
contrast, other studies have found that overall
levels of cooperation over repeated games are
qualitatively similar when payoffs are equivalent
across these tasks (Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud
2006), with results depending on experimental
parameters (Kingsley and Liu 2014). However,
such studies have not examined the strategies
employed by the same subjects in different
tasks. This is particularly important due to the
strong evidence of large individual differences in
cooperation and strong behavioral subgrouping
(Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr 2001).
Here, we present a strategy that addresses all
the issues outlined above. We present a within-
subject methodology that maintains the same
financial incentive structure across two differ-
ent lab tasks. This allows us to examine the
extent to which cooperation can be generalized
across different task frames and incentive struc-
tures. By allowing such a high level of control,
this paradigm also presents a starting point from
which the effect of specific experimental manip-
ulations can be unambiguously measured.
We directly assess cross-task predictability
and the effect of incentive structure. Subjects
completed an experiment with two sections—a
PG section and a BD section, and within these
sections completed first and second mover
responses. We focus on the second mover
responses. For the PG games we adopted the
strategy game methodology (“P-game”) used in
Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr (2001) (see also
3. Perhaps because of “warm glow” effects (Andreoni
1995).
Selten 1967). Subjects stated their conditional
contribution in response to all possible integer
values of the mean of others’ contributions
(0–20). Subsequently they provided their first
mover contribution (as in a “C-game”). The PG
section included three versions of the game,
each with a different incentive structure. The
same three incentive structures were included
in the BD section, as well as a fourth incentive
structure used to test for violations of domi-
nance. The incentive structures were chosen to
correspond to three common BDs: prisoner’s
dilemma, stag hunt, and hawk-dove. In the PG
task this correspondence was achieved by trans-
forming the group summed contributions into the
shared payoff from the public good according to
either a linear, convex, or concave function (see
below for details). The use of quadratic func-
tions (following Isaac and Walker 1988, Keser
1996, Sefton and Steinberg 1996, and others)
also allowed us to examine whether there are
subtypes of individuals that cannot be identified
using only the linear structure. When responding
to the BD, subjects answered both as first mover
and second mover in all incentive structures. In
the second mover case, subjects were told the
other player(s) had chosen to cooperate. Our
experiment exploits the equivalence between
incentives in these second mover choices and in
the PG strategy task.
Our principal findings are as follows. First,
using a novel categorization method we grouped
subjects into three behavioral subtypes in the
PG game: 69% of subjects were conditional
cooperators, 11% were payoff-maximizers, and
20% were noncontributors. Second, both payoff-
maximizers and conditional cooperators were
sensitive to the incentive structure of the PG
game, although the effect was by definition
smaller for those who were categorized as condi-
tional cooperators. Only 9% of subjects exhibited
a pure matching strategy (i.e., contributed the
same amount as other players, regardless of the
incentive structure). We also found evidence for
cross-task stability: Cooperativeness in binary
social dilemmas was significantly predicted by
parameters describing an individual’s behavior
in the PG games. Furthermore, this predictive
accuracy was independent of incentive struc-
ture, with predictive power no better within an
incentive structure than between. We interpret
this as evidence for prosociality as a stable trait
that influences responses under all incentive
structures. However, subjects also demonstrated
variability across tasks. A substantial minority
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of individuals exhibited preference reversals
between PG and BD, even when incentive struc-
tures were held constant (e.g., an individual
cooperated in a BD but contributed little or
nothing in the equivalent PG).
The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows. In Section I.A, we describe the incen-
tive structures and show how they can be var-
ied in PG games to be made equivalent to the
incentive structures of prisoner’s dilemma, stag
hunt, and hawk-dove games, while also allowing
us to distinguish between the different possible
strategies being used by noninvestors and by con-
ditional cooperators. The experimental design is
described in Section II, and results are reported in
Section III. Section IV concludes.
A. Incentive Structures
As set out by Ledyard (1994), any PG game
environment can be described as follows. Each
agent, i= 1, … , N in the group holds an endow-
ment, zi. The PG is produced from contributions
out of this endowment, according to some func-
tion y= g(t) where t represents the part of the ini-
tial endowments that group members contribute.
The rest (xi) is retained, so that t =
∑N
i=1
(
zi − xi
)
.
The group’s outcome is then a= (y, x1, … , xN).
Each individual is assumed to derive utility from
the PG and from their own private good, accord-
ing to some function Ui(y, xi). The total payoff
for each participant is typically given by xi + y
N
.
Some of these parameters were fixed for this
study. N = 4 in all PG games, and zi = 20 for all
participants in each game. The functional form
taken by g(t) is specified as g(t)= (αt)β where α
and β are varied to generate the linear, convex,
and concave incentives. In the linear form of the
PG game, β= 1 to generate linearity, and α> 1
to provide the tension between private and social
incentives.4 To generate convexity β > 1; and for
concavity, β< 1.
These incentive structures generate different
second mover best-response functions under the
assumption of payoff maximization. The payoff
function for an individual can be summarized as
(1) πi = 20 − ti + 1
4
(
α
(
TJ + ti
))β
.
TJ is the sum of the other three players’ contri-
butions. Differentiating Equation (1) with respect
4. That is, while the dominant strategy (and therefore the
NE) is to contribute no points to the PG, the Pareto Efficient
outcome is for everybody to contribute all 20 points.
to ti gives the result that contributing an addi-
tional point to the public pot increases one’s own
payoff as long as
(2) 1 <
αβ
4
(
α
(
TJ + ti
))β−1
where β= 1, the condition in Equation (2) sim-
plifies to contribution whenever 1 < α
4
, a fixed
condition that, with α= 1.4, is never satisfied.
This generates the boundary solution where zero
contributions are always the best response to any
level of others’ contribution.
In the convex case with β> 1, the benefit from
contributing an additional point increases in both
TJ and ti. The more that has been contributed,
the more valuable is an additional contribution.
Substituting in the numbers used in this study,
with α= 0.07 and β= 3, the threshold amount
in the pot for which the value of an additional
contribution exceeds 1 is 62.35 points.
In the concave case with β< 1, the benefit
from contributing an additional point decreases
in both TJ and ti. The more that has been con-
tributed, the less valuable is an additional contri-
bution. The concave case employed in this study
uses α= 800 and β= 0.4, and an additional point
contributed to the public pot generates additional
private return only when the total contributions
are zero or 1 (the threshold is 1.85). Therefore,
except when others contribute nothing, there is no
payoff maximizing incentive to contribute to the
PG in the concave case. The workings are pro-
vided in Appendix S1, Supporting Information.
So far, the focus has been on the PG incen-
tive structures. But in order to explore the consis-
tency of behavior across contexts, it is necessary
to create scenarios that are equivalent in terms of
their payoffs, but different in their framing. To
do this, we make use of a little-recognized the-
oretical observation. Specifically, variants of the
standard PG and BD tasks can be created such
that the payoff structures are equivalent across the
two task formats at particular levels of PG contri-
bution (see Kollock 1998 for a discussion along
similar lines). Any strategy that relies solely on
the payoffs (of the respondent and/or of the other
players) will therefore lead to the same levels of
cooperation across task formats.
To understand how the payoff equivalence
is constructed, first consider the one-shot linear
PG task (“C-game”) with a total of four play-
ers. In each round, ti ∈ [0, 20], so the decision-
maker contributes any number of points between
0 and 20, knowing that the average of oth-
ers’ contributions will also be between 0 and
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FIGURE 1
Three Incentive Structures in Public Goods and Binary Dilemmas
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Note: The points marked on the pot payout functions show the possible combinations of cooperation and defection when the
PG game is reduced to the binary dilemmas.
FIGURE 2
Payoff Matrices for All Binary Dilemmas with One Other Player
Prisoner’s Dilemma (linear) 
Opponent
Cooperate
P
la
ye
r Cooperate 28 , 28 17.5 , 32.5 
Defect 32.5 , 17.5 22 , 22 
Stag Hunt (convex) 
Opponent
P
la
ye
r Cooperate 88 , 88 11 , 51 
Defect 51 , 11 40 , 40 
Hawk-Dove (concave) 
Opponent
P
la
ye
r Cooperate 31.5 , 31.5 24 , 44 
Defect 44 , 24 20 , 20 
Defect Cooperate Defect Cooperate Defect 
20. Consider instead a case where the decision-
maker’s choice set is limited to two possible
contributions; for example, ti ∈ {5, 20}. If all
players face the same restricted choice,5 the PG
game reduces to a BD between cooperating (by
contributing 20) and defecting (by contributing
5). This is illustrated in the leftmost panel of
Figure 1.6 The points marked on the pot pay-
out functions show the possible combinations of
cooperation and defection when the PG game is
reduced to the {5,20} BD described above. For
example, the leftmost highlighted point shows the
result of the Player and the Others all defect-
ing, resulting in a pot of 20 and a pot payout
of 28. The rightmost highlighted point shows
the result of Player and Others all cooperating,
with pot size 80 and pot payout 112. The four
highlighted payoffs from these cooperate-defect
choices form the prisoner’s dilemma shown in
the leftmost panel of Figure 2 (for a two-player
5. Section II details how a group would decide.
6. The incentive structures and payoffs shown in this
figure are those used in our experiment.
version) and Figure 3 (for a four-player version).
We are not the first to notice this equivalence,
which is clearly set out in Hauert and Szabo
(2003) and discussed in some detail by Cony-
beare (1984), but we are the first to use the equiv-
alence to test consistency of behavior within-
subjects across task frames.
Similar equivalences can be constructed for
stag hunt games and for hawk-dove games. In a
PG game where the transformation determining
the public good payoff is convex in summed con-
tributions, the benefit from contributing an addi-
tional point to the public pot increases in the aver-
age of others’ contributions. When reduced to
a binary choice between cooperation (contribute
all) and defection (contribute nothing), the choice
is equivalent to the stag hunt dilemma in the mid-
dle panel of Figures 2 and 3. This is illustrated in
the context of the PG game in the rightmost panel
of Figure 1. If the payoff transformation is con-
cave, as in the middle panel of Figure 1, the bene-
fit of contributing an additional point to the public
pot declines with the average of others’ contri-
butions. This can be reduced to the hawk-dove
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FIGURE 3
Payoff Matrices for Binary Dilemmas with Three Other Players
Prisoner’s Dilemma (linear) 
Opponent
Cooperate
P
la
ye
r Cooperate 28 , 28 12.25 , 27.5 
Defect 37.75 , 22.75 22 , 22 
Stag Hunt (convex) 
Opponent
P
la
ye
r Cooperate 44 , 44 1 , 21 
Defect 28.5 , 18.5 20 , 20 
Hawk-Dove (concave) 
Opponent
P
la
ye
r Cooperate 26.5 , 26.5 21 , 28 
Defect 32 , 25 20 , 20 
Defect Cooperate Defect Cooperate Defect 
TABLE 1
The Proportion of Subjects Choosing to Defect
in Each Binary Dilemma, as First and Second
Mover
Facing One Other Facing Three Others
First
Mover (%)
Second
Mover (%)
First
Mover (%)
Second
Mover (%)
Linear 66 54 74 63
Concave 54 64 62 67
Convex 45 10 55 14
BD shown in the rightmost panel of Figures 2 and
3, where the best response is to defect when the
other player(s) cooperate, but cooperate when the
other(s) defect.
One difference between the PG game and the
classic BD games is the number of other players.
In the BD the decision-maker typically faces
just one other player instead of three others. To
account for this, our design features two- and
four-player versions of the BDs. Tables 1 and 2
give the payoffs for the two- and four-player BD
games, respectively.
TheNash equilibria for the BDswith two play-
ers are as follows. The prisoner’s dilemma has a
single Nash equilibrium (NE) of {D,D} despite
the efficient outcome being {C,C}. This captures
the private-social tradeoff and reflects the struc-
ture of the linear PG game. The hawk-dove has
two pure strategies NE, {C,D} and {D,C}. That
is, one should defect if the other cooperates and
vice versa. This logic is reflected in the concave
PG game. There also exist two pure strategies NE
for the stag hunt, {C,C} and {D,D}, reflecting the
increasing returns to contributions in the convex
incentive structure of the PG game.
Turning to the four-player versions, the struc-
ture is that a single player is facing a group
of three others who will vote on their preferred
outcome. The NE are equivalent to those for
two players for the concave and convex ver-
sions. However, it is not possible to select val-
ues in the prisoner’s dilemma (linear case) with
three other players that produce the incompati-
bility between payoff maximization and socially
optimal outcomes, since the requirement that the
other players divide the payoff by three precludes
this. Therefore the NE for the four-player ver-
sion of the prisoner’s dilemma is {D,C}. The
“group of others” has a dominant strategy to
cooperate regardless of the single player’s behav-
ior. While this clearly changes expectations about
others’ behavior, relevant for the first mover
choice, it does not change the fact that the sin-
gle player’s own dominant strategy is to defect.
In our experiment we exploit the equivalence
between second mover BD tasks and “second
mover” responses elicited through the strategy
version of the PG game.
II. METHODS
A. Overview
The experiment was divided into two sections:
a PG section (including both P- andC-games) and
a BD section. Each section included sets of ques-
tions implementing the three different incentive
structures introduced above. Subjects answered
all questions in both sections. The order of the
sections and of the question sets within each
section were randomized for each subject.
B. PG Game
The PG section included three sets of ques-
tions. In each set we implemented one of the
three incentive structures outlined above. Sub-
jects were informed that they were part of a group
of four players. Each player was endowedwith 20
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TABLE 2
Proportion of Subjects Choosing to Defect in Each Binary Dilemma
Linear Concave Convex
First
Mover (%)
Second
Mover (%)
First
Mover (%)
Second
Mover (%)
First
Mover (%)
Second
Mover (%)
Facing one other
Conditional 65 51 53 58 44 8
Free-rider 85 85 77 85 62 15
Other 50 60 30 90 40 20
Facing three others
Conditional 72 58 61 62 56 12
Free-rider 92 100 77 92 62 15
Other 80 70 70 90 50 30
Note: Subjects are categorized by the traditional Fischbacher, Gächter, and Quercia (2012) method.
points and they allocated as many of them as they
wished to the public pot.7 Points in the public pot
were transformed into the “pot payout” accord-
ing to the formula in Equation (1). The pot payout
was shared equally between the four group mem-
bers. Each individual’s payoff was therefore the
total of the points they did not contribute and their
share of the pot payout. The payoff for player i is
summarized in Equation (3), where πi is the pay-
off for player i given a contribution of ti, N is the
total number of players, and total contributions
are
∑N
i=1 t
i.
(3) πi = zi − ti + 1
N
(
α
N∑
i=1
ti
)β
.
As described previously, the pot payout was
a linear, concave, or convex transformation of
summed contributions as determined by the
parameters α and β. In the linear case α =1.4 and
β = 1; in the convex case α = 0.07 and β = 3; and
in the concave case α = 800 and β = 0.4.8
To communicate the incentive structures in an
intuitive way we developed an interactive com-
puter interface in which the relationship between
the groups’ contributions to the pot and the
pot payout was plotted graphically, as shown
in Figure 4. The subject could use a slider to
change the level of summed contributions to the
pot, and the program reported the correspond-
ing pot payout, as well as the respondent’s own
share of the pot payout. The amounts updated
in real time as the slider was moved along. We
7. Points were converted to GBP at a rate of 20 points to
£1.00, for the question selected to be played out.
8. These parameters were chosen to produce the same
incentive structure in the PG and BD tasks as outlined above
(Figure 1).
ensured that respondents familiarized themselves
with the slider by requiring them to fill in worked
examples for each of the three incentive struc-
tures. We measured whether subjects understood
the task by requiring them to answer a number
of example questions before progressing to the
main task.
Next, subjects completed three sets of ques-
tions (one for each incentive structure). Each set
included a P-game (Fischbacher, Gächter, and
Quercia 2012), in which subjects were asked
how many points they would contribute if they
knew that the other players were going to con-
tribute an average of X points. Responses were
elicited for all possible integer values of X (0-
20). These form the “second mover” responses
used for the main analyses. Subjects then com-
pleted a C-game, reporting how many points
they would contribute if they did not know how
many the other players were going to contribute.
Finally (following, e.g., Fischbacher, Gächter,
andQuercia 2012), subjects were askedwhat they
expected the other player(s)’ average first mover
contribution to be.
C. Binary Games
The binary games were based on four incen-
tive structures: the three structures outlined above
plus an incentive structure with transparent dom-
inance and no conflict between individual and
collective welfare. The latter was included as a
check that respondents were paying attention and
understood the task. For each of the four incentive
structures subjects provided first mover responses
against one other person (Figure 2), first mover
responses against three other people (Figure 3),
second mover responses against one other person
and second mover responses against three other
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FIGURE 4
An Example of the Experiment Interface for the PG Task with the Concave Incentive Structure Plotted
Graphically
Note:Moving the slider would update the numerical values displayed underneath in real time.
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people. When playing against three others, sub-
jects were told that the three other people would
all independently choose their favored response
and that the majority choice would be played.
The dilemmas were presented in a grid, with
different colors used to represent the payoffs
for self and other(s). This presentation was
supplemented by a written description of what
the payoffs to the respondent and to the other
player(s) would be for all four potential outcomes
in that dilemma. There were two information
screens: one for the choices where the subject
faced one other player and one for the choices
where the subject faced three other players. After
each information screen, the subject made their
choices (as first and second mover under each
of the four incentive structures9). For the first
mover choice, the subject chose between Top
(cooperate) and Bottom (defect). The second
mover choice was also presented as a decision
between Top and Bottom, but this time in the
knowledge that the other player(s) would choose
Left. To make this clear, the irrelevant column
of the table was covered with a translucent gray
overlay (Figure 5). The order of blocks (1 other
then 3 other or vice versa) was randomized
between subjects, and the order of the four
incentive structures within each of these blocks
was also randomized. Each first mover question
was always immediately followed by the relevant
second mover question.
The task was incentivized by informing play-
ers that one question would be selected at ran-
dom for each individual. This could be any of the
choices from the first or second mover responses
from either the PG or the BD tasks. If a PG task
was selected, three other subjects were chosen
at random to provide the “others”’ responses. If
the subject’s role was as first mover, then their
unconditional estimate was averaged with those
of two others to generate the average contribu-
tion which was then rounded. The fourth player’s
conditional contribution was used to complete the
public pot. If their role in the PG task was second
mover, the (rounded) average of the other three
players’ unconditional contributions was used,
and the subject’s relevant conditional cooperation
amount was used to complete the public pot.
9. Although we refer to the choices as first and second
mover, this does not imply that the choices were all sequen-
tial, with one person always choosing first then the second
choosing based upon their response. These terms were never
used in the task instructions or procedure. Subjects were told
the two cases represented situations where no players knew
what the other(s) would choose, and times where they already
knew what the other player(s) would do.
FIGURE 5
Binary Choice as Displayed to Subjects
(Example, Second Mover), with “Your Points”
Displayed Using Green, and “Their Points”
Displayed Using Blue
Note: This example is from the information screen and
these specific payoffs were not used in any of the real tasks.
If a BD task was selected with one other
player and the role of second mover was selected
there was no need to use the responses of any
other player, and the subject simply received the
relevant payout. If in this task, the role of first
mover was selected, then another subject was
chosen at random and their first mover response
was used as the other player choice. If a BD task
was selected with three other players, then this
could not be properly incentivized using subjects
from within this task, as none completed a voting
task (which forms the responses of the others in
the three other condition). Therefore, an auxiliary
study was conducted where subjects were told
they were one of three individuals voting for the
BD choice.10 Three subjects from this auxiliary
task were selected to provide the votes in the BD
with three others.
The experiments were programmed online
using Qualtrics, and JavaScript was used for the
interactive displays. All 117 subjects in the main
experiment, and the additional 11 subjects fill-
ing the role of the “others” in the BD section,
were recruited through Prolific Academic and
completed the experiment over the internet. Eth-
ical approval was granted by the University of
WarwickHumanities&Social Sciences Research
Ethics Committee. Subjects in the main exper-
iment received a fee of £6 for participating in
addition to earnings based on their choices in the
10. A total of 11 new subjects were recruited from the
same prolific academic subject pool as the main study. These
subjects were told that at the end of the study a random
number between 1 and 10 would be selected. If the number
was 10 then one of the questions would be picked and played
for real. No subject got a number of 10.
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experiment. Points were converted into money
at a rate of 5 pence (0.05 GBP) per point, and
subjects’ choice-dependent earnings ranged from
£0 to £4.50. Payment amounts were calculated
and paid as soon as all data collection was com-
plete. The mean earnings were £7.46 in total.
Subjects in the short auxiliary experiment were
paid £1.50 for participating in addition to having
a 1 in 10 chance of receiving a reward based on
their choices.
III. RESULTS
A. Exclusions
We report the full results here using responses
from all subjects who provided a response for
every question (as a result, only three subjects
were excluded). There are of course many rea-
sonable criteria upon which one could exclude
subjects from the analysis. We take a default
approach of reporting analyses using the full set
to ensure maximum openness and prevent any
danger of selective exclusions driving significant
results or of particular criteria potentially exclud-
ing subjects employing unusual strategies. How-
ever, for all of the reported analyses a parallel
analysis has been performed upon a subset of
subjects selected using deliberately conservative
inclusion criteria. An individual was excluded
from this subset if they chose the dominated
option in any of the four BDs with the transparent
dominance incentive structure, or if they began
the main experiment without having answered all
practice questions correctly. This resulted in 37
subjects being excluded. The qualitative result
remains the same in all analyses, and quantita-
tive differences are also small (e.g., 26% over-
all preference reversal, as opposed to 28% in the
full sample).
B. Categorizing Individuals by “Traditional
Types” in the PG Game
We begin by replicating Fischbacher, Gächter,
and Quercia’s (2012) categorization, which we
will refer to as the “traditional type” categoriza-
tion. This method relies solely upon responses
in the PG game with a linear incentive structure.
Individuals are categorized as free-riders if they
contribute zero regardless of the average con-
tribution of others (13 subjects, 11%). They are
categorized as conditional cooperators if their
contributions rise monotonically with others’
contributions, or if there is a significant positive
correlation between their contributions and the
contributions of others (89 subjects, 78%). They
are categorized as “triangle responders” if the
maximum amount they contributed is not given
in response to the maximum contributions by the
other players and either (a) subjects’ contribu-
tions rise monotonically toward their maximum
contribution and decline monotonically after that
or (b) there is a significant positive correlation
between their contributions and those of the other
players up to the maximum point and a negative
correlation thereafter (10 subjects, 9%). All oth-
ers are categorized as “other” (two subjects, 2%).
These proportions are similar to those found in
previous studies. Due to the low number of trian-
gle and other responders, we follow the approach
of several previous papers by combining them.
C. Responsiveness to Incentive Structures
We next test whether behavior differed
between the incentive structures. To provide a
summary view, the mean contribution and the
95% confidence intervals were calculated for
each level of “others’ contribution” for each
incentive structure in the P-game. The results are
plotted in Figure 6 which shows that, although
all three patterns approximate conditional contri-
bution, there are significant differences between
the incentive structures. When “others’ contri-
butions” are low, subjects generally contribute
less in the convex condition than in the concave
condition. When “others’ contributions” are
high, subjects contribute more in the convex
than in the concave incentive structure. These
differences are in the direction of payoff maxi-
mization, indicating that subjects understood the
incentive structures. In fact, despite the largest
group being “conditional co-operators” only nine
subjects (8%) exhibited pure contribution match-
ing across all incentive structures, while only five
subjects (4%) exhibited pure noninvestment. The
majority of subjects (all but 14) changed their
behavior in response to the incentive structure.
To quantify behavior within each incentive
structure, polynomial fits were estimated for
each individual’s set of 21 responses under each
incentive structure. Second-order polynomial fits
were estimated. The mean coefficients and 95%
confidence intervals are shown in Figure 7. The
confidence intervals show that there are clear
differences between incentive structures. The
quadratic component is largest for responses in
the convex condition, whereas the linear slope
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FIGURE 6
Levels of Contribution in the PG Game under Each Incentive Structure
Note: The shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals around the mean.
FIGURE 7
Parameters of the Model Fits for PG Game Responses, by Incentive Structure, Pooling All
Respondents, with 95% Confidence Intervals
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component is largest for the linear structure, and
smallest for the convex.
D. PG Responses by Subtypes
To examine how conditional cooperators, free-
riders, and triangle/other responders behaved
under each incentive structure, the mean con-
tributions and confidence intervals were plotted
separately for each subtype. Figure 8 shows
clear differences between the categories. The
leftmost panel shows that, despite their catego-
rization (a strict interpretation of which would
suggest they will simply match or respond to the
contributions of others regardless of associated
outcomes) conditional cooperators actually mod-
erate their behavior according to the incentive
structure.
The middle panel illustrates a limitation of
the traditional classification. Free-riders were so
classified because they contributed nothing in
the linear incentive structure. However, clearly
they do not all exhibit this behavior in the con-
vex or concave incentive structures. Consider, for
example, the convex structure. Inclusion of this
structure allows us to distinguish between behav-
ioral subtypes that respond identically in the lin-
ear case. Specifically, a noninvestor and a payoff
maximizer would both contribute 0 (i.e., free ride
in the linear condition). In the convex structure,
however, a payoff maximizer would contribute
20, while a noninvestor would contribute 0 in
response to the maximum possible contribution
of others. The large confidence intervals around
the mean in the middle row panels hide an under-
lying bimodal distribution.
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FIGURE 8
Levels of Contribution in the PG Game in Different Incentive Conditions with Subjects Categorized
by the Traditional Fischbacher, Gächter, and Quercia (2012) Methods
Note: The shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean.
We, therefore, develop an alternative cate-
gorization technique based on responses across
all incentive structures. The three categories
are conditional cooperator, payoff maximizer,
and noninvestor. We first create the profile of a
hypothetical exemplar responder for each type.
The exemplar conditional cooperator always
matches the contributions of the “other players,”
the exemplar payoff maximizer always makes
the contribution that maximizes their own payoff,
and the exemplar noninvestor always contributes
zero. Subjects are categorized as the subtype
whose exemplar they most closely resemble
(resemblance is quantified in terms of summed
squared distance between subjects’ and exem-
plars’ responses). As with the traditional clas-
sification method the majority of subjects were
classified as conditional cooperators (79 subjects,
69%). However, our novel exemplar-based tech-
nique allowed us to classify the remaining sub-
jects as either payoff-maximizers (12 subjects,
11%) or noninvestors (23 subjects, 20%). This
classification could not be achieved using the
standard linear PG game. Figure 9 shows that
the contribution patterns of these groups match
the description of their behavior and strategy.
E. BDs: Variability
Next we turn to BDs. Table 1 gives the pro-
portion of subjects defecting in each BD. Much
heterogeneity is evident between subjects, with
most defection rates between 45% and 74%.
The exceptions are the second mover choices
in the stag hunt (convex structure). The very
high levels of cooperation occur because once
the subject knows that others will cooperate,
cooperation option dominates defection11 (here
11. Note that the detected rate of defection in the second
mover convex BD is the one result that shows a meaning-
ful difference between the full and restricted sample. After
excluding subjects for failure to answer attention check BDs
and failing to complete understanding questions, the rates of
defection fall to 1% when facing one other and 1% when fac-
ing three others.
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FIGURE 9
Levels of Contribution in the PG Game in Different Incentive Conditions with Subjects Categorized
by the Novel Exemplar Matching Method
Note: The shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean.
we define dominating as both own and others’
payoffs being higher). When comparing defec-
tion rates in first and second mover choices, there
is a tendency for decreased defection rates in the
prisoner’s dilemma (linear structure) when acting
as the second mover. In the hawk-dove game
(concave structure), there is a slight tendency to
increase defection, but these changes are small.
For full statistical analysis see Appendix S2.
F. BDs and Responder Types
The overall levels of defection and cooper-
ation may mask more homogenous patterns of
behavior within groups of responders. Therefore,
defection rates are shown separately for each
responder subtype; first by traditional types in
Table 2 and then by our exemplar based types
in Table 3. If individuals’ strategies are stable
across tasks, then there should be less heterogene-
ity within subtypes than in the sample overall.
For specific subtypes there are clear predictions.
For example, one would expect all free-riders
and payoff maximizers to defect in all prisoner’s
dilemmas, and one would expect all conditional
cooperators to cooperate in all secondmover pris-
oner’s dilemmas. Table 2 shows that patterns of
defection rates generally match these intuitive
predictions given the subtypes defined: Condi-
tional cooperators appear generally less likely
to defect than other individuals, and free-riders
are generally most likely to defect. However, the
effect of responder type is far from deterministic:
The largest difference between types within any
single question is a 48 percentage point difference
in defection rates. This is the difference between
the conditional cooperators and the payoff max-
imizers (as defined by our exemplar method)
when making second mover choices in the pris-
oner’s dilemma.
Performing statistical analyses upon defec-
tion rates is difficult due to the small number
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TABLE 3
Proportion of Subjects Choosing to Defect in Each Binary Dilemma
Linear Concave Convex
First
Mover (%)
Second
Mover (%)
First
Mover (%)
Second
Mover (%)
First
Mover (%)
Second
Mover (%)
Facing 1 other
Conditional 62 44 49 58 43 8
Payoff maximizers 83 92 67 92 42 8
Noninvestors 70 70 61 70 52 17
Facing three others
Conditional 71 57 59 62 53 14
Payoff maximizers 83 83 75 83 67 8
Noninvestors 78 74 65 74 57 17
Note: Subjects are categorized by the novel exemplar matching method.
of subjects in some groups (e.g., free-riders and
other) and the lack of variation in convex choices
(with almost all subjects cooperating when act-
ing as second mover). Logistic regressions were
performed for each combination of first/second
mover and number of other players, separately
for the traditional types and exemplar types. Full
results are presented in Appendix S2 but, to sum-
marize, the only comparison showing any sig-
nificant main effect of responder type is when
subjects were acting as the second mover against
one other player. The traditionally defined free-
riders, and the exemplar-defined payoff maxi-
mizers and noninvestors were all more likely to
defect than the corresponding conditional coop-
erators. However, comparing the log-likelihoods
of different models demonstrates that the exem-
plar method is more accurate at predicting second
mover responses.
G. Preference Reversals
To provide a more robust test of cross-task
consistency, each individual’s responses in one
task were compared to their responses in the
equivalent incentive structure of the other task
to identify preference reversals. To demonstrate
how preference reversals are identified, take the
linear structure as an example. The choice to
defect in the BD is equivalent to contributing 5
in the PG. The choice to cooperate in the BD is
equivalent to contributing 20 in the PG. There-
fore, anyone who cooperates in the BD, and
then contributes 5 in the PG exhibits an unam-
biguous reversal of preference. This is also true
for anyone who cooperates and then contributes
less than 5. For individuals who defect in the
BD, a contribution of 20 in the PG indicates an
unambiguous preference reversal. Since we are
interested in cases of unambiguous reversals, we
restrict our analysis to subjects who contribute
an amount in the PG equal to or greater than
the amount equivalent to cooperating in the BD,
and those who contribute an amount in the PG
equal to or smaller than the amount equivalent to
defecting in the BD.
Table 4 shows in parentheses the total number
of the 114 subjects who contributed an amount
greater than or less than these values, and the
associated percentage indicates the proportion
of those subjects who indicated the reverse pref-
erence in their BD choice. Looking across all
subjects regardless of whether their level of PG
contribution would make it possible to unam-
biguously identify preference reversals, we find
that in the second mover condition with three
others, 30.7% of all subjects unambiguously
reversed their preference in the linear condition,
36.8% did so in the concave condition, and
15.8% in the convex condition.
H. Predictions across Tasks Using Continuous
Measures
Despite the significant proportion of prefer-
ence reversals, it remains possible that there is
a link between behavior in the two tasks. This
link is clearly not deterministic, and not well
described by a subject’s categorization, but an
individual who exhibits “cooperative” response
patterns in the PG game may be more likely
to cooperate in the BDs. To examine this, we
return to the individual-level polynomial regres-
sions outlined earlier and use the estimated coef-
ficients from the regressions upon behavior in the
PG game (see Section III.C). A further, logistic
regression was used to predict BD choices using
these (z-scored) estimates of curve, slope, and
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TABLE 4
Number of Subjects (in parentheses) Who in the PG Game Contributed at Least the Amount
Equivalent to Cooperating in the BD, and Who Contributed an Amount No More than that Equivalent
to Defecting in the BD
First Mover Second Mover
Cooperation Given
<Min Contribution
Defection Given
>Max Contribution
Cooperation Given
<Min Contribution
Defection Given
>Max Contribution
One other
Linear 29% (24) 58% (60) 21% (24) 47% (60)
Concave 48% (27) 53% (53) 22% (27) 53% (53)
Convex 46% (13) 44% (77) 77% (13) 6% (77)
Three others
Linear 21% (24) 68% (60) 13% (24) 53% (60)
Concave 37% (27) 62% (53) 30% (27) 64% (53)
Convex 38% (13) 55% (77) 85% (13) 9% (77)
Note: The associated percentages indicate the proportion of those subjects who exhibited the reverse preference in their BD
choice.
intercept as independent variables. All incentive
structures were included in the one model on sep-
arate rows, for example, the polynomial coeffi-
cients estimated from a subject’s responses in the
linear PG game were used to predict the like-
lihood that they would defect in the linear BD
games, and those from the concave PG game
were used to predict responses from the concave
BD games etc.
The model intercept is −0.13 (CI= [−0.25,
0.10], p= .258). The strongest predictor is
the polynomial intercept term (β=−1.33,
CI= [−1.79, −0.87], p< .001), with smaller
significant results for the polynomial linear
term (β=−.74, CI= [−1.20, −0.27], p= .002)
and the polynomial quadratic term (β=−.39,
CI= [−0.68, −0.10], p= .009). All three coef-
ficients are negative indicating that higher
intercept, steeper slope, and greater curvature
in an individual’s PG response profile predict
lower probability of defecting in BDs. The model
overall shows that the polynomial coefficients
are significantly predictive, with a McFadden’s
R-square of .102.
A similar analysis can be performed on the
first mover responses. In the PG game, each first
mover response is an integer between 0 and 20.
This was entered into a logistic regression (along
with an intercept term) to predict whether the
individual then defected in the corresponding
first mover choice in the BD game. The intercept
term is larger than zero (β= .57, CI= [0.35,
0.79], p< .001) indicating high baseline levels of
defection. There is also a significant effect of PG
first mover contribution in the predicted direc-
tion (β=−.37, CI= [−0.61, −0.14], p= .002),
meaning that if subjects contribute more in the
PG then they are less likely to defect in the BD.
However, the overall accuracy of predictions
(McFadden’s R-square of .025) is not as good as
in the case of the second mover responses. This
is likely due to subjects displaying caution due
to uncertainty about other players’ contribution
levels, and the additional variability caused by
different subjects making different assumptions
about the other players’ likely contribution levels.
I. Generalized Individual-Level Traits or
Structure-Specific Strategies?
Finally, we ask whether individuals can be
described as having an underlying propensity
to cooperate in all situations. Such a tendency
would be akin to a personality trait, which could
be labeled “pro-sociality.” If so, cross-task pre-
dictability should be as good across as within
incentive structures. The alternative possibility
is that individuals’ cooperativeness is specific
to incentive structures. If this is so, individu-
als’ rates of cooperation will show greater cross-
task predictability when the incentive structures
are identical.
For this analysis, we return to the individual-
level polynomial regressions outlined earlier and
use the estimated coefficients from the regres-
sions upon behavior in the PG game. To examine
whether strategies are specific to incentive struc-
tures, a logistic regression was used to predict
BD choices using these estimates of curve, slope,
and intercept.
Specifically, we examined whether an individ-
ual’s cooperation in the BDs under one incentive
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FIGURE 10
Deviance Estimates for Each Model with 95% Confidence Intervals, Demonstrating no Improvement
in Prediction within than between Incentive Structures
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Note: The asymmetrical confidence intervals are a natural result of the bootstrap estimation method. For some models there
is a negative skew in the deviance of the bootstrap samples.
structure is better predicted by the estimated
parameters obtained from their responses in the
PG game within that incentive structure than by
the parameters obtained from the PG games with
the other incentive structures. Therefore, nine
separate regression models were estimated—one
for every pairwise combination of PG incen-
tive structure and BD incentive structure. The
deviance (a goodness of fit measure) was then
used to assess the predictive accuracy of each
of the nine models. To provide confidence inter-
vals, a bootstrapping approach was used. For
each regression, 10,000 bootstrap samples were
randomly selected with replacement from the
subjects in our data set. Figure 10 shows the
deviance estimates for each model and the con-
fidence intervals around them. The deviance is
very similar regardless of the incentive structure
used to estimate the PG parameters, and the con-
fidence intervals overlap substantially. Thus there
is no evidence of any advantage to using incentive
structure-specific estimates of cooperativeness,
consistent with the idea that prosociality is a trait.
IV. DISCUSSION
The viability of predicting behavior in labo-
ratory social dilemmas from behavior on other
laboratory tasks has not been well established,
despite a number of investigations (Apesteguia
and Maier-Rigaud 2006; Binmore and Shaked
2010; Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann 2011;
Camerer 2011; Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez
2019; Kingsley and Liu 2014). If such a link
cannot be established, claims that results in the
laboratory can inform us about behavior in deci-
sion contexts outside the laboratory where the
stakes, framing, and incentives all differ are pre-
mature. The results presented here established
just such cross-task predictability, but also note
its limitations. More specifically, we find that
contribution levels in PG tasks predict choices in
BD tasks, but that there is significant stochasticity
and that even strictly defined responder types do
not deterministically predict responses in differ-
ent tasks, even when the incentives are identical.
We obtained our results from what is, to our
knowledge, the first experiment that compares
behavior within subjects across PG games and
binary social dilemmas with identical financial
incentives. Our novel paradigm allowed us to
test the validity and generalizability of labo-
ratory social dilemmas more strictly than has
been previously possible, since all normatively
relevant aspects of the decisions can be held
constant. We addressed two key questions. First
we asked what strategies were employed in
the PG game when incentive structures were
modified, including whether the traditionally
identified categories of individuals could also
characterize behavior in nonlinear incentive
structures. Second we asked whether behavior
in the PG games predicts behavior in BDs, and
whether this predictive ability is specific to par-
ticular incentive structures or if strategies predict
behavior across incentive structures as well as
across tasks.
We applied the traditional categorization of
individuals according to their behavior in the PG
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game with a standard, linear incentive structure
(Fischbacher, Gächter, and Quercia 2012), and
found proportions of conditional cooperators,
free-riders, and other responders that were in
keeping with the existing literature. However, the
standard categorization based on the linear PG
game confounds own-payoff maximization and
a simple strategy of noninvestment, since these
produce indistinguishable behavior (i.e., noncon-
tribution at all levels). By introducing different
incentive structures and categorizing individuals
by their fit with “exemplar” subtypes, we were
able to distinguish payoff maximization and non-
investment. We find that many individuals who
are traditionally categorized as free-riders can
more accurately be described as either payoff
maximizers or noncontributors. This alternative
categorization better captures the contributions in
the nonlinear incentive structures, suggesting that
the traditional categorization method cannot be
extended beyond the linear PG task.
Both the noncontributors and the payoff max-
imizers were sensitive to changes in the incentive
structure, with their aggregate behavior adapt-
ing to changing incentives in the direction that
would improve their own payoff. This behavior
is an important departure from that predicted by
a strict interpretation of conditional cooperation,
according to which individuals match the con-
tributions of others. Instead, this result suggests
that their responses reflect a compromise between
prosocial preferences for contribution or outcome
equality, and payoff maximization. We see little
evidence that the behavior of these individuals is
the result of simple imitation strategies, with only
9% of subjects always matching the contributions
of the other players.
Next we turn to the question of cross-task pre-
dictability. Subjects responded to a set of BDs
as first and second mover in addition to the PG
game. These BDs were designed such that the
financial incentive structures matched those of
the PG games at the levels of contribution equiv-
alent to defect and cooperate choices. This prop-
erty is crucial as it allows the direct assessment of
cross-task consistency while the incentive struc-
ture is held constant.
We found a significant relationship between an
individual’s likelihood of cooperating in the PG
game and their BD choices. This relationship was
weak when using PG game categorization to pre-
dict BD choices, with only one analysis showing
a statistically significant increase in defection
for payoffs maximizers. However, by using the
continuous nature of PG responses to make more
fine-grained probabilistic predictions of BD
choices, accuracy was dramatically increased
and the relationship was significant across tasks.
A further question was whether cross-
task consistency only occurs when incentive
structures are identical. If individuals applied
qualitatively different strategies under different
incentive structures then it might be possible
to predict BD choices from PG contributions
when incentive structures match (e.g., linear
from linear), and yet not possible to predict BD
choices from PG contributions when incentive
structures differ (e.g., linear from convex). An
alternative possibility is that cross-task predic-
tion is possible but is not sensitive to incentive
structure. Such a result would be consistent with
the existence of an individual-level trait, such as
prosociality or other-regarding preference that
influences behavior in all tasks and incentive
structures. The results favor the latter possibility.
Overall, there is a significant relationship
between responses in the PG and BD tasks.
However, this link is far from deterministic.
When the rates of cooperation in the BDs were
calculated separately for different PG responder
types, the differences in choice proportions
were in line with the intuitive expectations,
but there was still much heterogeneity within
responder types. If subgroups were applying a
particular strategy consistently then one would
expect individuals of the same type to display
the same behavior. To illustrate, define “high
agreement” as occurring when at least 90% of
individuals within a group respond in the same
way on a given choice. This level of agreement
was found in only 14% of cases12 (excluding
questions involving dominance) when subjects
were classified by our exemplar method, and
in 17% of cases when subjects were classified
using the traditional method (see Tables 2 and 3).
Furthermore, in 28% of cases, individuals exhib-
ited unambiguous preference reversals between
tasks—either by cooperating in the BD and con-
tributing less than the defect amount in the PG
game, or by defecting in the BD and contributing
more than the cooperate amount in the PG game.
Preference reversals in the former direction are
substantially more common than in the latter.
In summary we have two findings that
appear hard to reconcile: There is significant
cross-task predictive power, but there is also
significant within-group heterogeneity with
12. A “case” here refers to a subgroup-question combi-
nation as defined in the cells of Tables 2 and 3.
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even unambiguous preference reversals being
relatively common. However, when considered
as a whole, these results support the hypothesis
that individuals have stable prosociality traits
that influence their propensity to cooperate,
while at the same time their strategies can also
vary between tasks. Such variation could reflect
framing and other structural differences. A stable
trait such as this would act as a parameter on
task-specific strategies. The presence of this
same parameter value in different task strategies
explains the cross-task correlations in behavior.
However, the fact that individuals can be differ-
entially sensitive to particular framing effects,
and that different strategies can be applied by
different individuals in each task explains the
heterogeneity in responses. This interpretation
also explains why behavior cannot be better
predicted within an incentive structure, as indi-
viduals are likely to employ the same strategy
within a task, regardless of the incentive structure
associated with that specific question.
Our framework of stable traits and changing
strategies may seem something of a departure
from typical approaches in experimental eco-
nomics. However, it is actually very similar to
the approach taken in many other parts of the
literature. As an analogue, consider how indi-
viduals respond in tasks involving risky financial
gambles. Individuals respond significantly dif-
ferently in choice tasks than in valuation tasks,
similarly to how they behave differently in
different social dilemma tasks. However, an
individual who displays strong risk aversion
when choosing between risky gambles is also
likely to show strong risk aversion when valuing
risky gambles. This risk aversion may manifest
itself differently in the two tasks; nonetheless,
once one has a robust model of behavior in each
task, risk aversion can be estimated in one, and
then used to predict responses in the other. Our
results suggest that the same approach can be
used in social dilemma tasks, opening a new
route to understanding prosocial behavior in a
variety of settings.
Why do we find consistent levels of cooper-
ation across both tasks and incentive structures
while a number of other studies have not? There
are two possible reasons for the different patterns
of findings. On one interpretation, studies which
have failed to find cross-task or cross-incentive-
level correlations may be theoretically miscon-
ceived in that their chosen tasks do not assess
the same dimensions of prosociality. A second
possibility is that extraneous and theoretically
irrelevant/uninteresting noise variables explain
the discrepancy by in some way either over-
whelming or obscuring effects of a true under-
lying prosociality trait. We incline toward the
latter interpretation. Our study differs from ear-
lier experiments in several ways, in particular by
holding incentive structures constant across task
frames. Further research will be needed to iden-
tify the specific features that determine whether
evidence for a stable personality-like prosocial-
ity trait will be found in a particular study, but the
results we have presented here, in providing evi-
dence for cross-task prosociality under carefully
controlled experimental conditions, may provide
at least a starting-point for such an exploration.
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